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LOWERING THE STAKES OF THE
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT
ADITI BAGCHI*

ABSTRACT
Every country has to make hard choices about the distribution of entitlements.
But employers control the entitlements that individual Americans enjoy to a far
greater extent than those in other rich democracies. In this Essay, I argue that,
in the absence of the political consensus necessary to deliver state solutions to
political questions, employers here are assigned an exaggerated role in
employees’ lives. Government incentives for and directives to employers have
become a strategy of political deflection. The effect has been to raise the stakes
of employment well beyond the scope of those terms and conditions that relate
to attracting and extracting productive labor.
I consider three examples of political deflection to employers. Employers
control employees’ access to healthcare and free speech and, more recently,
have imposed public health measures such as vaccination mandates. Employers’
rules are backed by the threat of termination. This Essay argues that relying on
contractual authority rather than political authority to distribute social rights
and obligations in this way undermines political legitimacy. Governments might
see the private sector as a relatively apolitical refuge through which public
policies can be pursued stably over the course of political shifts. But removing
questions about who gets and owes what from politics and subjecting employees
to raw power, as we do when we raise the stakes of employment and lower the
stakes of politics, detracts from the rightful function of politics to mediate
disagreements among us.

*

Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. Many thanks to Rory Van Loo
for inviting me to participate in this Symposium and for comments received on an initial
presentation of this Essay at the accompanying conference.
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INTRODUCTION
As a child, one does not grasp why it matters which job you will end up with.
Children tend to talk a lot about what they will do and who they will be, and they
are encouraged to think about what they like or whom they admire. Only decades
later, if ever, are they encouraged to think about starting salaries, career ladders,
and job structure. As luck would have it, our early naïveté may be
inconsequential: the choices that we make tend not to matter as much as external
factors outside of our control. Although the factors that determine how we are
sorted into different jobs are not those that animate childhood whimsy, we were
right to intuit all along that the kind of job we end up with matters enormously.
Most obviously, the job one has—together with the job of one’s spouse—
drives the amount of resources available to a person to pursue her life projects.
Will she live paycheck to paycheck, eating better at the beginning of the month
than toward the end of it, or will she have disposable income to spend on luxury
goods and services? Will she travel the world or feel trapped by her zip code?
How many children can she afford and on what life path will she set them?
Some of her income may buy leisure time. The working hours associated with
her job will also directly determine the quantity of her leisure time. Employment
will determine stability and security, social status, potentially self-respect, and,
of course, how she experiences most of her waking hours as an adult.
Compensation and status are variable features of employment in every variety
of democratic capitalism.1 Even security, leisure, and self-respect, though they
may vary less in other wealthy countries, are rarely uniform across the labor
market.2 To the extent that these goods depend on employment to a greater
degree in the United States, this appears to be the result of negative rather than
affirmative public policies.3 Neither state nor federal governments set out to
delegate to employers the task of distributing anxiety or prestige; the distribution
of those goods and burdens is incidental to the system we use for allocating
social resources like labor, capital, land, and other property. Most people in the
United States are persuaded that relying on the marketplace to allocate such
resources benefits us overall, even though the market rewards people differently
for their contributions.4
1
See, e.g., David Rueda & Jonas Pontusson, Wage Inequality and Varieties of Capitalism,
52 WORLD POL. 350, 350-51 (2000) (noting increases in distribution of wages in capitalist
economies).
2
Omer Moav & Ofer Cohen, Who Needs Job Security?, AZURE, Autumn 2008, at 1, 8
(noting flexibility of U.S. labor market is due, in part, to variable wages—lack of extensive
income protection—and lack of uniform severance pay and job security).
3
Id. at 8 (stating U.S. employees do not have extensive income or welfare protection).
4
Hannah Hartig, Stark Partisan Divisions in Americans’ Views of ‘Socialism,’
‘Capitalism,’ PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 25, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2019/06/25/stark-partisan-divisions-in-americans-views-of-socialism-capitalism/
[https://perma.cc/XJH4-QCS5] (observing 65% of Americans have positive impression of
capitalism, wherein people rely on market for resources instead of government, in contrast to
42% for socialism).
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Remarkably, though, there are some basic social entitlements that the federal
government has intentionally delegated to private employers, even though
employers themselves might not otherwise have sought to control them.
That is, we have not simply accepted that people will be paid more or less,
enjoy greater or weaker job security, work harder or less hard, depending on
their labor market power. We have effectively upped the ante and expanded the
set of life consequences associated with labor market power beyond what a
market-based economy in principle entails by way of tax incentives and other
legal and social pressure on employers.
Without aiming to be exhaustive, I will discuss two disparate entitlements:
speech rights and healthcare. In the United States today, an individual’s ability
to speak and write freely and her ability to access healthcare are both critically
dependent on her employer.5 We have not and probably could not agree on a
more direct government role for controlling access to speech and healthcare.6 In
light of social divisions, ours has been a deliberate public policy of lowering the
stakes of political discourse in favor of raising the stakes of the employment
contract.
More recently, we have seen this go still further, beyond defining individual
entitlements and into the context of defining individual responsibility. In the face
of significant public health pressures, city, state, and federal governments have
sought to require individuals to get vaccinated against COVID-19.7 But they
have not dared to impose a vaccine requirement on citizens qua citizens. Instead,
they have deflected political responsibility for mandates by delegating to
employers enforcement of a vaccine mandate. It is clear that there is no appetite
for a direct mandate on American residents and that, one way or the other,
management of public health will be delegated to employers to a considerable
degree.
5

See infra Part II.
See, e.g., Bradley Jones, Increasing Share of Americans Favor a Single Government
Program to Provide Health Care Coverage, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Sept. 29, 2020),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/09/29/increasing-share-of-americans-favor-asingle-government-program-to-provide-health-care-coverage/
[https://perma.cc/H5GFRYPQ] (noting that 63% of U.S. adults who say government has responsibility to provide
health coverage for all, 36% say it should be via single national government program, and
26% say it should be provided through mix of private insurance companies and government
programs).
7
See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 14,043, 86 Fed. Reg. 50,989 (Sept. 9, 2021) (requiring
COVID-19 vaccination for federal government employees and contractors); COVID-19
Vaccination and Testing; Emergency Temporary Standard, 86 Fed. Reg. 61,402 (Nov. 5,
2021) (requiring employers of over 100 workers to develop, implement, and enforce
mandatory COVID-19 vaccination or testing policy), withdrawn, 87 Fed. Reg. 3,928 (Jan. 16,
2022) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1910); Erin Tiernan, Boston Mayor Michelle Wu
Announces Vaccine Mandate amid Jeers, BOS. HERALD (Dec. 23, 2021, 9:10 PM),
https://www.bostonherald.com/2021/12/20/boston-mayor-michelle-wu-announces-vaccinemandate-for-restaurants-gyms-sports-venues/ (discussing vaccine mandates of Boston, New
York City, and Los Angeles).
6
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The effect of using employer authority to compensate for a weak state is that
employment, more so than ever or elsewhere, is the site at which one’s
entitlements and obligations are set. And these entitlements and obligations are
set and controlled by employers, with government incentives and directives in
the background; they are imposed on employees, backed by the threat of
termination.8 I will argue that relying on contractual authority rather than
political authority to distribute social rights and obligations beyond
compensation and other basic terms and conditions of employment undermines
political legitimacy even when it is intended to protect it. Governments might
see the private sector as a relatively apolitical refuge through which public
policies can be pursued stably over the course of political shifts. But removing
questions about who gets and owes what from politics and subjecting them to
raw power, as we do when we raise the stakes of employment and lower the
stakes of politics, detracts from the rightful function of politics to mediate
disputes among us about how we should live together.
My argument will proceed in three parts. In Part I, I will review the concept
of decommodification developed in the literature on comparative political
economy and propose an analogue concept about “employment stakes” for local
use that is not attached to Marxist theory. In Part II, I will show how employment
stakes are singularly high in the United States by reviewing the examples of
speech, healthcare, and vaccination requirements. In Part III, I will argue that
relying on contractual authority rather than political authority to decide
individuals’ rights and obligations is a perverse strategy that ultimately
undermines the quality of our democracy.
I.

VARIETY IN EMPLOYMENT SCOPE

In 1990, Gøsta Esping-Andersen published his now classic study of welfare
states in the twentieth century, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism.9
Despite over two decades of debate about whether his typology of capitalist
regimes accurately or most productively captures the range of states that we
observe, Esping-Andersen’s three broad regime types remain an intuitive and
powerful lens through which to make sense of institutional diversity.10
8
See, e.g., More than 150 Houston Methodist Hospital System Workers Fired or Quit After
Refusing to Get COVID-19 Vaccine, CBS NEWS (June 23, 2021, 5:01 AM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/houston-methodist-hospital-system-workers-fired-quitcovid-19-vaccine/ [https://perma.cc/B3DT-N3EJ] (noting Houston Methodist Hospital
required employees to be completely vaccinated by June 7, 2021, and suspended 178
employees for two weeks without pay after they did not comply).
9
GØSTA ESPING-ANDERSEN, THE THREE WORLDS OF WELFARE CAPITALISM (1990)
(recasting methodology and concepts of political economy to evaluate welfare state).
10
See Wil A. Arts & John Gelissen, Models of the Welfare State, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF THE WELFARE STATE 569, 571-72 (Francis G. Castles, Stephan Leibfried, Jane
Lewis, Herbert Obinger & Christopher Pierson eds., 2010) (discussing widespread comment
on Esping-Andersen’s work spanning twenty years). While critics have offered modifications,
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Esping-Andersen proposed three ideal types of welfare regimes: liberal (or
neo-liberal or libertarian states, like the United States), conservative (or neocorporatist states, like Germany), and social-democratic states (most famously,
Sweden).11 These states vary on many subtle dimensions,12 and of course, no
one state conforms perfectly to its “type”;13 I cannot do credit to his nuanced
study here. Roughly, liberal states are characterized by minimalist, means-tested
welfare assistance and individualized labor markets in which employment
contracts are set at the firm level, often without any labor union involvement.14
Conservative regimes offer assistance that reinforces the family as the first unit
of social relief, as well as traditional gender roles within it.15 Their social
insurance programs build on neo-corporatist labor market institutions and also
reinforce occupational status distinctions across the labor market through
segmented collective bargaining.16 Finally, social-democratic regimes, such as
those in Scandinavia, offer universal and generous welfare schemes sponsored
by strong states that aim to decommodify citizens and reduce social
stratification.17 Decommodification “occurs when a service is rendered as a
matter of right, and when a person can maintain a livelihood without reliance on
the market.”18 Social-democratic states are associated with cross-class labor
confederations that coordinate across the economy.19 Esping-Andersen is
Danish, but scholars working in all three regime types that have used his
typology tend systematically to reserve their accolades for the social-democratic
model.20
some friendly and others critical, no competitive typology has displaced Esping-Andersen’s
as the dominant one. See, e.g., id. at 571-72, 580-83.
11
ESPING-ANDERSEN, supra note 9, at 26-28 (noting that the three types of regimes have
differentiated expectations).
12
Id. at 26 (recognizing there are qualitatively different arrangements between state,
market, and family across social rights and welfare-state stratification).
13
Id. at 28.
14
Id. at 42-43.
15
Id. at 27 (stating that corporatist regimes are typically shaped by traditional familyhood
and family benefits encourage motherhood).
16
Id. at 24 (recognizing neo-corporatist markets have distinct programs for different class
and status groups, each with its own set of distinct rights and privileges designed to
complement their “appropriate” station in life).
17
Id. at 27-28.
18
Esping-Andersen, supra note 9, at 21-22.
19
Arts & Gelissen, supra note 10, at 572-77.
20
See, e.g., ROBERT E. GOODIN, BRUCE HEADEY, RUUD MUFFELS & HENK-JAN DIRVEN,
THE REAL WORLDS OF WELFARE CAPITALISM 261-62 (1999) (“[O]ur analysis, however,
has . . . single[d] out the social democratic welfare strategy as strictly dominant over both the
others.”); Duane Swank, Social Democratic Welfare States in a Global Economy:
Scandinavia in Comparative Perspective, in GLOBALIZATION, EUROPEANIZATION AND THE
END OF SCANDINAVIAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY? 85, 89, 95 (Robert Geyer, Christine Ingebritsen
& Jonathon W. Moses eds., 2000) (“[P]ublic provision of social services, including health and
employment services, is more developed in the Nordic model than in other welfare states.”).
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While most critiques of the original typology quibble with the number of
regime types or the labeling of particular countries,21 the most potent critique
came from Clare Bambra and others, arguing that Esping-Andersen had
concentrated on the effects of a regime only on the male worker, neglecting the
extent to which “welfare state regimes[] facilitate female autonomy and
economic independence from the family.”22 In later work, Esping-Andersen
largely conceded this point and attempted to incorporate the concept of
“defamilialization” by broadening his inquiry into the range of means by which
individuals manage social risks.23
One of Esping-Andersen’s main insights is that capitalist countries with
developed welfare states do not all aim to achieve the same objectives, and in
fact, they do not produce the same results.24 Most importantly, he emphasized
variation on the matter of whether citizens have rights by virtue of their
citizenship to social services and benefits or, alternatively, whether they must
rely on the labor market to secure basic necessities.25 This is the question of
decommodification.26 He also differentiated countries on the matter of where
individuals look for security in the face of risk: the state, the market, or family.27
Finally, he evaluated states for their degree of social integration, or alternatively,
stratification by income or other status.28

21

See, e.g., Peter A. Hall & David Soskice, Introduction to VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE
INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 1, 8 (Peter A. Hall & David
Soskice eds., 2001) (offering new two-regime typology); John Hudson & Stefan Kühner,
Analyzing the Productive and Protective Dimensions of Welfare: Looking Beyond the OECD,
46 SOC. POL’Y & ADMIN. 35, 38-39, 42-43 (2012) (contesting regime criteria and extending
application outside Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development); Francis G.
Castles & Deborah Mitchell, Worlds of Welfare and Families of Nations, in FAMILIES OF
NATIONS: PATTERNS OF PUBLIC POLICY IN WESTERN DEMOCRACIES 93, 106 (Francis G. Castles
ed., 1993) (disaggregating liberal type).
22
Clare Bambra, Defamilisation and Welfare State Regimes: A Cluster Analysis, 16 INT’L
J. SOC. WELFARE 326, 327 (2007).
23
See GØSTA ESPING-ANDERSEN, SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF POSTINDUSTRIAL ECONOMIES
45-46 (1999) (noting that, for example, while large proportion of women are precommodified
in that their welfare derives from being in family, female independence necessitates
defamilializing welfare obligations).
24
ESPING-ANDERSEN, supra note 9, at 22.
25
Id. at 21 (“[I]f social rights are given the legal and practical status of property rights, if
they are inviolable, and if they are granted on the basis of citizenship rather than performance,
they will entail a de-commodification of the status of individuals vis-à-vis the market.”).
26
Id. at 21-22; see also Gøsta Esping-Andersen, Multi-Dimensional Decommodiﬁcation:
A Reply to Graham Room, 28 POL’Y & POL. 353, 353 (2000) (referring to decommodification
“a citizen’s relative independence from pure market forces”).
27
ESPING-ANDERSEN, supra note 9, at 26-28.
28
Id. (noting liberal regimes result in class stratification that is a blend of relative equality
of poverty among those receiving welfare and market-differentiated welfare among the rest,
conservative regimes emphasize upholding status differentials, and social-democratic states
offer the same rights regardless of status).
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While scholars of political economy have long been interested in levels of
inequality, Esping-Andersen’s emphasis on decommodification introduced a
different standard by which to evaluate capitalist economies. While inequality
speaks to integration or stratification and turns on the relative resources that
individuals have, decommodification asks about entitlements, not just outcomes.
A citizen is “decommodified” if she does not have to rely on the market to meet
basic needs and wants.29 Esping-Andersen did not originate the concept of
decommodification; its origins are in Marxist theory.30 As Esping-Andersen’s
peer Karl Polanyi explained, capitalism treats labor as a commodity available
for exchange.31 A worker is commodified in the Marxist sense as long as he sells
his labor rather than the goods produced with it.32 Esping-Andersen did not
incorporate the Marxist concept as such.33 He does not focus on workers’
productive roles; he is not concerned, therefore, with ownership of the means of
production and whether workers are alienated from their labor. Instead, he is
interested in their consumption, that is, their access to goods and services.34 He
reads history to deliver a clear verdict in favor of promoting workers’ returns to
labor by enhancing reservation wages rather than by intervening in structure of
production.35
Nevertheless, Esping-Andersen sets another sweeping and overambitious
threshold for decommodification. He provides that the minimal definition of
decommodification entails that “citizens can freely, and without potential loss
of job, income, or general welfare, opt out of work when they themselves
consider it necessary.”36 As Mark Kleinman observed, no capitalist country

29

Id. at 37.
See id. (noting that issue of commodification was central to Marx’s analysis of class
development).
31
See KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION 73 (Beacon Press 1957) (1944). The
extent and scope of Polanyi’s concept of decommodification is itself unclear and contested.
See, e.g., Gareth Dale, Social Democracy, Embeddedness and Decommodification: On the
Conceptual Innovations and Intellectual Affiliations of Karl Polanyi, 15 NEW POL. ECON. 369,
386-87 (2010) (criticizing Polanyi’s understanding of decommodification based on his
misjudgments of economic policy regimes); CLAUS OFFE, CONTRADICTIONS OF THE WELFARE
STATE 14 (John Keane ed., 1984) (developing decommodification idea further while noting
contradiction in fact that various branches of welfare state are compelled to perform
commodification and decommodification, two incompatible functions).
32
See ESPING-ANDERSEN, supra note 9, at 21 (“Stripping society of the institutional layers
that guaranteed social reproduction outside the labor contract meant that people were
commodified.”).
33
Esping-Andersen, supra note 26, at 355 (noting he does not believe that “self-realisation
in working life is intrinsic to the commodity status of labour”).
34
Id. at 354.
35
Id. at 353-54 (arguing that, historically, welfare strategy, the need for workers to be
secure and resourceful before creating communal economy, demonstrated superiority over
orthodox strategy, which is characterized by altering means of production for equality).
36
ESPING-ANDERSEN, supra note 9, at 23.
30
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would aspire to such a standard.37 No country sets out to make it possible for
people simply to choose not to work without suffering any kind of setback, and
most of us would reject such a standard in principle as outside the demands of
justice.
Perhaps the lesson is that decommodification should be reconceptualized
further. But given how far it has already come from its Marxist origins, a
different lesson can be that decommodification as such is not the best measure
of success for welfare state regimes. The idea is compelling because it is a proxy
for a more specific phenomenon than the theory behind it implies: the degree of
power that employers exercise over workers. Indeed, Esping-Andersen himself
observed that decommodification “strengthens the worker and weakens the
absolute authority of the employer.”38
Others have more or less directly pointed to the short discussion of employers
in Esping-Andersen’s work as a significant limitation. Robert E. Goodin and
Martin Rein have suggested that we think more about who pays for and supplies
the services of the welfare state.39 Peter A. Hall and David Soskice not only
reduced the three types to two clusters—liberal market economies and
coordinated market economies—but also shifted focus to employers as the
engine that determines which model prevails in a given country, as well as that
model’s evolution over time.40
Combining the interest in employer control and employer provision, we arrive
at the following question to ask of any regime: To which social goods do
employers regularly control access? Or as I will suggest below, when are
employers the gatekeepers and allocators of goods for social purposes other than
labor compensation? In every capitalist society that Esping-Andersen and his
interlocutors considered, employers offer varied renumeration to employees for
their work.41 In some countries, employers have more latitude than others about
the terms and conditions they may offer.42 That latitude gets at the question of
how much turns on the particular job that an individual holds. Elevating the
social wage by mandating minimum wages or paid time off is one way of
37
MARK KLEINMAN, A EUROPEAN WELFARE STATE?: EUROPEAN UNION SOCIAL POLICY IN
CONTEXT 30 (2002).
38
ESPING-ANDERSEN, supra note 9, at 22.
39
Robert E. Goodin & Martin Rein, Regimes on Pillars: Alternative Welfare State Logics
and Dynamics, 79 PUB. ADMIN. 769, 770 (2001) (“The central organizing question in regime
discourse is ‘who gets what, and on what conditions?’ The ‘pillar’ perspective sees things
from the provider’s point of view. The central organizing question in pillar discourse is ‘who
pays, and who provides?’”).
40
Hall & Soskice, supra note 21, at 8.
41
See ESPING-ANDERSEN, supra note 9, at 43 (noting in liberal regimes, social insurance
pegs entitlements and benefits to varied employment, work performance, and contributions).
42
See id. at 23 (noting that, for example, in some countries, sickness insurance that
guarantees benefits equal to normal earnings, with minimal proof of medical impairment
requirements and for the duration that the individual deems appropriate, are usually reserved
for white-collar employees).
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reducing variation among employment contracts. Such variation speaks to the
level of inequality and stratification in a society.
However, the concept of commodification is powerful because it captures
something more than inequality at the aggregate level. It speaks to the power
dynamic in employment relationships at the micro level.43 It does not, however,
distinguish between the various goods and services that employment contracts
might control. The concept did not seem to anticipate that employment contracts
would be a site for distribution of goods even beyond the “ordinary” terms of
renumeration for labor. In the United States, employment determines the extent
to which employees have access even to goods that the employer would not
wield as compensation but for public policies that affirmatively assign
responsibility for those entitlements to employers. While the welfare state might
shield employees from dependence on employers for certain kinds of goods and
services, our institutions also rely on employers to allocate other goods and
services that employers would not use as compensation absent legal incentives.
One might immediately and rightly object that there is no natural line between
goods or entitlements that employers would offer as compensation and those that
are “artificially” introduced as consequences of employment. This is no doubt
true—and I would not attempt to draw a clear line. Nevertheless, it is useful to
distinguish in principle between terms of the employment contract that the
employer itself uses in order to attract and extract productive labor from terms
that the employer uses in order to avoid some legal liability. The most clear
example of a compensation-driven term are cash wages. Employers will pay
employees different amounts depending on their marginal productivity and the
available supply of substitutable labor.44 By contrast, a hypothetical term that
offers employees free iPads because the tax code makes them cheaper for the
employer to provide them than for the employee to purchase them directly is
“artificial.” If the price difference for employers and employees is substantial,
employers would be gatekeepers for access to iPads. Whether one has an iPad
would then turn on what kind of job one has and who one works for, more so
than if iPads were purchased directly. If iPads were purchased directly, we
would expect people with more money to be more likely to have an iPad (or to
have multiple iPads or newer models), but the iPads that people have will also
reflect to a considerable degree the strength of their own preferences with respect
to iPads. Some high-income employees will choose not to buy one at all. Some
low-income employees will spend their first disposable dollars on the newest
model. Most importantly, an employee’s decision to work or remain with a
particular employer will not turn on her eligibility for an iPad at her place of

43
Graham Room, Commodification and Decommodification: A Developmental Critique,
28 POL’Y & POL. 331, 332 (2000).
44
See Kenneth Burdett & Dale T. Mortensen, Wage Differentials, Employer Size, and
Unemployment, 39 INT’L ECON. REV. 257, 258, 269 (1998) (noting employers pay wages
conditional on other workers’ behavior and that productivity impacts wages).
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employment. She will not, for example, be reluctant to leave her employer when
she is nearing the hypothetical six-month eligibility mark.
Is it terrible for employers to allocate iPads to employees directly? We might
not worry too much about this hypothetical role of employers if iPads are not
regarded as a critical resource for individuals. I will argue below that we should
worry about it when the stakes we have introduced into the employment
relationship are higher, as they are in the case of speech rights and healthcare.
II.

ASSIGNING PUBLIC FUNCTIONS TO EMPLOYERS

In this Part, I will discuss three consequences of American employment that
are the result of legal incentives for employers rather than their desire to
optimally attract and extract productive labor. The first two are social goods,
albeit quite fundamental ones: speech rights and healthcare. I will then turn to a
more recent condition of employment, a potential duty to be vaccinated. In each
case, the state has effectively delegated to employers the task of allocating a
good or a burden. In each case, there are good reasons why policy evolved as it
did. But we are nevertheless left with an unsavory state of affairs, in which, far
from decommodifying employment, our institutions have artificially raised the
stakes of employment even beyond those that follow from employers’ business
interests.
A.

Off-site Speech

Speech rights are at first blush universal in the United States. After all, the
First Amendment guarantees them for everyone.45 Because the First
Amendment only limits government regulation of speech, however, it does not
ensure that individuals are permitted to say whatever they want without
penalty.46
Nor should it. There are good reasons to think that individuals should face
consequences for certain kinds of harmful speech even when the government
ought not to regulate that speech. This is most obviously true of entirely private
speech: if your friend repeatedly says hurtful things to you, you probably should
cease to be her friend. Unfortunately, it is less clear who should be in the position
to “cancel” harmful speech that is public. Employees are just people, and they
often make false, irrational, dangerous, ridiculous, or vicious statements,
including racist or sexist comments—both at work and outside of it.47 When
people make comments at work, it is easier to see that employers are both
45

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 482, 486-87 (1957) (holding that certain categories
of speech are not protected, and the government can prohibit and punish those types of speech
without violating First Amendment).
47
See, e.g., Stella Chan, Augie Martin & Alicia Lee, Tech CEO Resigns After Video Shows
His Racist Rant Towards Asian-American Family at California Restaurant, CNN BUS. (July
13, 2020, 5:58 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/07/13/business/michael-lofthouse-resignracist-rant-trnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/R6K8-8GP7].
46

1196

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 102:1185

appropriately responsible for the work environment and have a legitimate
interest in controlling its tenor.48
But of course, employees make comments that are potentially wrongful
outside of work as well, and then it is less clear what the appropriate role of the
employer is in policing their speech.49 After all, they also make comments that
are not wrongful but are simply unfavorable to the employer; the employer may
“idiosyncratically” judge such comments as wrongful.50 Still, when speech
targets vulnerable members of society or operates to perpetuate social
hierarchies, it is doubtful that the speakers are entitled not to suffer any
consequence for their speech acts, even if the government ought not to directly
prohibit or penalize such speech. But what lesser, civil consequence should such
speech have, and equally important, who decides in each case? Should
irresponsible speakers simply lose their friends? Should they lose their jobs?
Should they be shunned by grocery stores and banks, common carriers and
utility companies? I do not purport to offer a solution to the problem here. My
point is that we not only disagree about what kinds of speech are harmful, but
there is also a further absence of public consensus on what the consequences of
harmful speech should be, if any, and who should decide them.
What has emerged is a default regime: employers are frequently called upon
to terminate employees when they are associated with offensive speech, and
employers frequently oblige.51 Because this social practice enables us to punish
those who engage in wrongful speech without running afoul of the First
Amendment, there is little initiative to question whether employers are the right
entities to decide to punish offensive speech when it is far removed from the
workplace. After all, as discussed further below, employers’ incentives as to how
to handle off-site speech turn on factors that do not systematically correspond to
the merits of that speech or its relevance to the workplace. Assigning the social
function of policing speech to employers also has consequences for many
employees who do not engage in speech that is offensive to public values: once
48

See, e.g., Lora Kolodny, Tesla Factory Workers Have Filed a Lawsuit Claiming
Widespread Racism, Unsafe Conditions, CNBC (Nov. 15, 2017, 11:48 AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/11/14/tesla-class-action-lawsuit-alleges-racism-unsafe-factoryconditions.html [https://perma.cc/2JJM-KND4] (stating that Tesla and Elon Musk personally
contributed to racist culture at Tesla by failing to stop factory workers from using racial
epithets, failing to take corrective action against harassers, and firing Black workers who
complained).
49
See, e.g., Nicholas H. Meza, Comment, A New Approach for Clarity in the
Determination of Protected Concerted Activity Online, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 329, 329-30 (2013)
(noting employees regularly share opinions online, and employers struggle to determine when
discipline is appropriate).
50
See, e.g., id. at 351-52 (detailing incident where bartender was dismissed for criticizing
employer’s tipping policy on Facebook).
51
See, e.g., Jonah E. Bromwich, Amy Cooper, Who Falsely Accused Black Bird-Watcher,
Has Charge Dismissed, N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02
/16/nyregion/amy-cooper-charges-dismissed.html (noting that Cooper was fired after gaining
notoriety for her racist conduct at the park).
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employers are empowered to monitor and control employees’ off-site speech,
they can terminate employees for many kinds of speech that are not to their
liking, including speech that is simply critical of the employer and its goods or
services.52
My limited purpose here is to observe that the consequence of our
disagreement about liability for speech, either the substantive standards of
propriety or the procedural question of who should apply those standards and
how, has made employers the gatekeepers for speech. In some cases, they are
reluctant gatekeepers; they are responding to the concurrent threats of legal
liability and consumer boycott. In other moments, they can abuse their
gatekeeper status to control speech with limited public consequence that is
simply critical of the employer itself.53
Employers are subject to some limitations in their control of employee speech.
Most notably, the government itself is prohibited from using the threat of
dismissal from public employment as a means of inhibiting speech. In Pickering
v. Board of Education,54 the Supreme Court balanced a citizen’s interest in
speaking about matters of public concern against the government-employer’s
interest in efficiently providing public services.55 Although Pickering protection
is to some extent vulnerable to the ideologies of the government in power,56 it
enjoys the robustness of constitutional grounding. But while the Pickering rule
is significant in its own domain, it does not apply to employees of private
employers, who are not subject to the constraints of the First Amendment.57
However, employees of private employers are not altogether without
protection. At the federal level, protection is narrow: section 7 of the National
Labor Relations Act prevents employers from interference with concerted action
by employees.58 This has been interpreted to encompass speech, including
speech outside of work.59 If an employee’s speech is directed to another
employee, the Board considers a slew of factors to determine whether any
disciplinary measure taken against the employee was permissible, including
whether the employer maintained a specific rule prohibiting or otherwise
previously condemned the language used by the employee, whether the
employee’s statement was impulsive or deliberate, whether the discipline
imposed upon the employee was consistent with past discipline for similar acts,
52
See, e.g., Meza, supra note 49, at 351-52 (stating employee was dismissed not for hate
speech but for criticizing employer’s tipping policies).
53
See, e.g., id.
54
391 U.S. 563 (1968).
55
Id. at 565-67, 574.
56
See, e.g., Nancy M. Modesitt, The War on Whistleblowers, 6 U. PA. J.L. & PUB. AFFS.
603, 627 (2021) (describing Trump Administration’s hostile moves to weaken whistleblower
protection for federal employees).
57
See Pub. Utils. Comm’n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 461 (1952) (noting First and Fifth
Amendments only restrict federal government, not parties such as employers).
58
National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157.
59
Pier Sixty, LLC, 362 N.L.R.B. 505, 531 (2015).
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whether the disciplinary measures were directed at offensive speech rather than
protected activity, and whether the employer had a record of anti-union
hostility.60
The Board has found itself increasingly charged with adjudicating cases in
which employees have posted comments on social media and has issued
guidance by way of examples of protected and unprotected conduct.61
Employees’ disparaging comments about an employer are protected as long as
the comments are related to working conditions or other workplace grievances.62
However, the Board recently pulled back under the Trump Administration by
requiring more evidence that an employee intended to “initiate, induce, or
prepare for group action.”63 While some commentators would have the Board
adopt a still more restrictive but also more predictive rule,64 others regard the
evolution of doctrine concerning social media as broadly consistent with longstanding precedent.65
While the interpretation of section 7 and satisfaction with it has varied (and
this observer would favor a more protective standard), on the whole, the generic
language of the statute has been broadly construed to ensure that speech
plausibly intended to mobilize employees toward concerted action is protected.66
60

Id.
See Memorandum from Anne Purcell, Nat’l Lab. Rels. Bd. Assoc. Gen. Couns., to Reg’l
Dirs., Officers-in-Charge & Resident Officers (Aug. 18, 2011) (available at
https://apps.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d458056e743) (“Recent developments in the
Office of the General Counsel have presented emerging issues concerning the protected
and/or concerted nature of employees’ Facebook and Twitter postings, the coercive impact of
a union’s Facebook and YouTube postings, and the lawfulness of employers’ social media
policies and rules.”); Memorandum from Anne Purcell, Nat’l Lab. Rels. Bd. Assoc. Gen.
Couns., to Reg’l Dirs., Officers-in-Charge & Resident Officers (Jan. 24, 2012) (available at
https://apps.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d45807d6567) (collecting cases where
employees were terminated as result of social media activity).
62
Sierra Publ’g Co. v. NLRB, 889 F.2d 210, 216 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]ppeals to third
parties forfeit § 7 protection only if their connection to the employees’ working conditions is
too attenuated or if they are unrelated to any grievance which the workers may have.”).
63
Alstate Maint., LLC, 367 N.L.R.B. No. 68, 4, 8 (Jan. 11, 2019) (noting that “other
evidence that a statement made in the presence of coworkers was made to initiate, induce or
prepare for group action—such as an express call for employees to act collectively—would
also support a finding of concertedness”).
64
See, e.g., Meza, supra note 49, at 367 (arguing for a more bright-line but less protective
rule).
65
See, e.g., Ariana R. Levinson, Social Media and the National Labor Relations Board, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE LAW 337, 337 (John A. Rothchild ed.,
2016) (“This chapter buttresses the claim that Board regulation of social media policies is
consistent with past practice and precedent by analogy to Board precedent governing
employer policies on solicitation and distribution and on the wearing of insignia, which are
similar to the social media policies currently being regulated.”).
66
Fresh & Easy Neighborhood Mkt., Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. 151, 167 (2014) (Miscimarra,
Member, concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he Board majority announces a broad
61
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However, it does not even aspire to limit employer discipline of any other kind
of employee speech intended only to complain about the employer, colleagues,
or customers, let alone matters unrelated to employment. Even when speech falls
within the bounds of section 7, the employer can still discipline or terminate the
employee if the speech was sufficiently “disloyal.”67
State legislatures have offered protection beyond the context of collective
mobilization.68 Many states, such as California, Colorado, North Dakota, and
Louisiana, have statutes that protect employees from dismissal for political
activity or specific categories of protected speech.69 And many unionized
workplaces offer protections against arbitrary dismissal that arguably protect
speech more ably than more narrowly drawn protections that are speechspecific.70 But most workers are subject to at-will dismissal and do not benefit
from those procedural protections.71
Legislative protections of speech are critical but fall short of what many
employees might intuitively expect given the vaulted status of “free speech”
principles in the popular American imagination.72 These statutes do not embrace
the more holistic protection recommended by, for example, the Restatement
(Third) of Employment Law. The Restatement rule would protect employees
whenever they engage in “lawful conduct that occurs outside of the locations,
hours, and responsibilities of employment and does not refer to or otherwise
involve the employer or its business,” and allow employees to express “political,
moral, ethical, religious, or other personal beliefs” outside of work as long as it

holding that ‘an employee seeking the assistance or support of his or her coworkers in raising
a sexual harassment complaint is acting for the purpose of mutual aid or protection’”).
67
See Sierra Publ’g Co., 889 F.2d at 216-18.
68
Genevieve Lakier, The Non-First Amendment Law of Free Speech, 134 HARV. L. REV.
2299, 2339-42 (2021) (“Today, as a result of all this [state] legislative activity, a significant
body of . . . ‘quasi-first Amendment law’ protects the expressive autonomy of public- and
private-sector workers even when the First Amendment cases do not.”).
69
Andrew Melzer & Whittney Barth, Whether Employees Can Be Fired for Participating
in Peaceful Protests, 2020 U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE 221, 228.
70
Cynthia L. Estlund, Free Speech and Due Process in the Workplace, 71 IND. L.J. 101,
102-03 (1995) (“[I]n the typical unionized workplace, employees enjoy much greater freedom
of expression—perhaps more than many public employees protected by the First
Amendment.”).
71
Id. at 102 (“[M]any employees in both the public sector and the private sector enjoy no
general legal protection against arbitrary discipline or discharge.”).
72
See, e.g., William R.H. Mosher, Speak No Evil – The Right to Limit Employee Speech
This Election Season and Beyond, FISHER PHILLIPS (Oct. 7, 2020),
https://www.fisherphillips.com/news-insights/speak-no-evil-the-right-to-limit-employeespeech-this-election-season-and-beyond.html [https://perma.cc/4G3H-TMWS] (“[M]ost
state laws granting private employees the right to engage in free speech limit those rights in
clear and specific ways. . . . New York’s free speech law only protects employees’ actions if
they are legal, take place off the employer’s premises, without use of the employer’s
equipment or property, and do not create a material conflict of interest with the employer’s
business.”).
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is done “in a manner that does not refer to or otherwise involve the employer or
its business.”73 While such protection for private speech is intuitively consistent
with the spirit of autonomy and free discourse implicitly endorsed by the First
Amendment, there is no blackletter law on the books that comes close to
realizing it.
To the contrary, instead of carving out a zone for private speech into which
employers may not intrude, public policies affirmatively push employers to
regulate employee speech. Again, the reason for relying on employers as
gatekeepers is compelling: we do not have a good alternative way to control
harmful speech.
One way employers are engaged as gatekeepers is by way of the threat of
liability. Employers are potentially liable when their employees post racist or
sexist comments on social media.74 Employers also face market pressure to
discipline or terminate employees whose words or conduct have made them
infamous online.75 In some cases, the employee’s notoriety is well deserved; in
other cases, it is not. In all cases, however, there is disagreement about whether
the employee deserves termination—and it is the employer that decides this
social question.
There is an important, attendant social cost to allocating such power to
employers. Risk-averse employees will avoid public expression that might ignite
the ire of either their employer or some other segment of the public that could
mobilize to pressure their employer. The chilling effect is not unlike the chilling
effect we could expect from the prospect of government sanctions; given the
immediate bread-and-butter implications of losing one’s job, the threat of
employer sanctions might be considerably greater.76 The role of employers as
speech gatekeepers has expanded just as employees are more likely to engage in
controversial public speech. At least two phenomena might contribute to this

73

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMP. L. § 7.08 (AM. L. INST. 2014).
See Little v. Windermere Relocation, Inc., 301 F.3d 958, 966-69 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding
that employer can be liable for off-site speech); Roy v. Correct Care Sols., LLC, 914 F.3d 52,
73 n.4 (1st Cir. 2019) (finding that Facebook messages could be considered when determining
if employee’s harassment created hostile work environment, particularly when those
messages were about workplace conduct and sent by someone who worked with plaintiff);
EEOC v. Fed. Express Corp., No. 94-cv-00790, 1995 WL 569446, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Aug.
8, 1995) (stating that there is “no serious dispute that an employer may face liability for sexual
harassment of employees by non-employees inside the workplace” and expressing doubt that
location matters).
75
Vikram R. Bhargava, Firm Responses to Mass Outrage: Technology, Blame, and
Employment, 163 J. BUS. ETHICS 379, 379 (2018) (“When an employee’s off-duty conduct
generates mass social media outrage[, b]usinesses commonly respond by firing the
employee.”).
76
Timothy Zick, The Costs of Dissent: Protest and Civil Liabilities, 89 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 233, 240 (2021) (“The chilling effect of these costs and liabilities on First Amendment
protest rights cannot be overstated.”).
74
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trend: First, social media has lowered the cost of access to a large audience.77
Second, there may be a cultural trend that encourages people to “speak their
mind” about a broader range of social causes but especially ones connected in
some way to their employer.78 While there is much to worry about concerning
the quality of contemporary public discourse, we should also worry about the
role of employers in regulating this discourse.
It is tempting to favor a simple solution to the gatekeeper problem, that is,
more expansive, categorical protections for employee speech—enacted by
statute or developed in case law.79 The problem is that there is a legitimate social
interest in controlling or creating accountability for online speech, which can be
genuinely harmful to workers subject to hostile work environments.80 The same
progressive forces that might otherwise have mobilized to protect a sphere of
employee autonomy will rightfully balk at eliminating accountability for certain
kinds of harmful speech. Public employees, including police officers, have been
terminated on many occasions for violating codes of conduct on social media by
posting racist comments.81 The same logic of harm and accountability apply to
private workplaces. But while the government is at least constrained by the First
Amendment and the Pickering doctrine when it draws a balance between the
rights of employees subject to harmful speech and the rights of employees to
engage in harmful speech, private employers are free to draw their counterpart
lines by reference to their interests alone.82 Each employer will draw it

77
See Eugene Volokh, What Cheap Speech Has Done: (Greater) Equality and Its
Discontents, 54 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2303, 2306 (2021) (observing that online speech has
democratized access to public discourse).
78
See Kelley Changfong-Hagen, “Don’t Be Evil”: Collective Action and Employee
Prosocial Activism, 5 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. ONLINE 188, 209 (2021) (discussing
“growing phenomenon of employee activism in the tech sector”).
79
See, e.g., Meredith McCaffrey, Comment, Public or Private? The Split over First
Amendment Protection of Union Speech by Public Employees, 60 B.C. L. REV. II.-274, II.288 (2019) (arguing Second Circuit was wrong for adopting a per se rule that any person who
speaks as a union member does so as a private citizen and thus is protected from retaliation
by the First Amendment).
80
See Tatiana Hyman, Note, The Harms of Racist Online Hate Speech in the Post-COVID
Working World: Expanding Employee Protections, 89 FORDHAM L. REV. 1553, 1588 (2021)
(“Racist hate speech can damage an employee’s psychological well-being and have adverse
effects on work performance both inside of the workplace and over the web.”).
81
See, e.g., Grutzmacher v. Howard County, 851 F.3d 332, 340 (4th Cir. 2017); Liverman
v. City of Petersburg, 844 F.3d 400, 405-06 (4th Cir. 2016); Venable v. Metro. Gov., 430 F.
Supp. 3d 350, 354 (M.D. Tenn. 2019).
82
See DAVID L. HUDSON, JR., FIRST AMENDMENT CTR., BALANCING ACT: PUBLIC
EMPLOYEES AND FREE SPEECH 2 (2002), https://www.freedomforuminstitute.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/09/fac_firstreport_public-employees-free-speech.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BG5G-CTTE] (“While the private employer probably can fire an employee
whose speech he dislikes, the First Amendment governs the circumstances under which public
employers may discipline employees for their speech.”).
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differently—thereby raising the stakes of which employer an employee happens
to work for.
If the blunt approach of adopting a blanket zone of protection for employee
speech imposes unacceptable costs on a few and threatens to erode the
legitimacy of public discourse for us all, the narrower alternative would be
spelling out in greater detail—by statute or case law—what kinds of speech
employers may or must penalize and carving such speech out from an articulated
sphere of protected speech. It is difficult to see those steps in our future. We
might agree that it is desirable to reign in employer power with respect to
employee speech. We might even accept, as a pragmatic compromise, the idea
of legal standards that specify precisely which speech employers may discipline.
But such standards ultimately would have to be developed by state actors—
legislative, administrative, or judicial. These state actors would then have to
make substantive judgments about what kinds of speech are permissible and too
harmful to others to warrant protection. In the current state of public discourse,
it is hard to imagine productive political action in this direction. Even if a
political faction could enact a substantive standard, they may not trust judges
with enforcing it.83 The vitriol of civic discourse makes the prospect of political
action dangerous. The impotence of politics reinforces our reliance on
employers to police speech, however imperfect guardians of civic discourse they
may be.
B.

Healthcare

Healthcare is the most evident and entrenched area in which American
employers exercise surprising control over employees—surprising in
comparison to employers in other advanced industrialized democracies.84
Nowhere else do employers control whether employees have access to a good
that many people regard in some form as a human right.85

83

See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Circumstances of Politics and the Application of
Statutes, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 558, 566 (2000) (book review) (explaining mistrust comes from
legislatures being unable to predict how courts will interpret statutes).
84
Aaron E. Carroll, The Real Reason the U.S. Has Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance,
N.Y. TIMES: THE UPSHOT (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/05/upshot/thereal-reason-the-us-has-employer-sponsored-health-insurance.html (“The basic structure of
the American health care system, in which most people have private insurance through their
jobs, might seem historically inevitable, consistent with the capitalistic, individualist ethos of
the nation.”).
85
Jeneen Interlandi, Why Doesn’t the United States Have Universal Health Care? The
Answer Has Everything to Do with Race., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/08/14/magazine/universal-health-careracism.html (“[T]he United States remains the only high-income country in the world where
such care is not guaranteed to every citizen.”).
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The history behind America’s employer-based health insurance regime is
quintessentially path dependent.86 During World War II, wage controls made it
difficult for employers to attract employees.87 Employers used benefit packages
to compete for workers because insurance and pension fund contributions were
not subject to the prevailing wage caps.88 American labor unions have famously
operated in the voluntarist tradition, seeking to improve working conditions
through private firm-level bargaining rather than political action.89 It was
consistent with this broad strategy that unions helped entrench employer-based
healthcare by advocating for health insurance as a benefit in the context of firmlevel collective bargaining.90 Later, tax incentives made health insurance an even
more enticing form of compensation: while taxable income for an employee
does not include employer contributions to health insurance, employers can
deduct those contributions from their income.91 The effect is a federal subsidy
that increases with the marginal tax rate to which an employee is subject. It is
the second-largest subsidy of the federal tax code after the mortgage interest
deduction.92
Recent healthcare reform efforts have shown that individuals are attached to
their existing insurance and that any pivot away from the employer-based model
would be politically costly, if not impossible.93 Therefore, recent legislation like
86

See Jacob S. Hacker, The Historical Logic of National Health Insurance: Structure and
Sequence in the Development of British, Canadian, and U.S. Medical Policy, 12 STUD. AM.
POL. DEV. 57, 76 (1998) (describing path dependence in healthcare policy); see also Paul
Pierson, Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics, 94 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 251, 251 (2000) (describing path dependence in social policy generally).
87
Stephen Mihm, Opinion, Employer-Based Health Care Was a Wartime Accident, CHI.
TRIB. (Feb. 24, 2017, 3:30 PM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/opinion/commentary/ctobamacare-health-care-employers-20170224-story.html (“As companies struggled to deal
with wartime labor shortages, the wage freeze left them in a serious bind: How could they
retain workers if they couldn’t give raises?”).
88
See David A. Hyman & Mark Hall, Two Cheers for Employment-Based Health
Insurance, 2 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 23, 25 (2001).
89
See WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT
6-8 (1991) (arguing American labor movement turned to voluntarism after political action
was repeatedly thwarted by judicial hostility); Derek C. Bok, Reflections on the Distinctive
Character of American Labor Laws, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1394, 1419 (1971) (arguing various
features of the American worker impeded class consciousness in favor of individualist
approach to labor reform).
90
Allison K. Hoffman, An Optimist’s Take on the Decline of Small-Employer Health
Insurance, 98 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 113, 114 (2013) (noting that “labor unions advocated for
health insurance as a benefit for workers”).
91
I.R.C. § 106 (excluding employer contributions to health insurance from employee
taxable income).
92
See Hyman & Hall, supra note 88, at 25-26.
93
Shefali Luthra, Do 160 Million Americans Really Like Their Health Plans? Kind Of,
KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Nov. 21, 2019), https://khn.org/news/do-160-million-americansreally-like-their-health-plans-kind-of/ [https://perma.cc/9F2J-5S4U] (“Articulating his
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the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) relies on the employer model to expand
access.94 Most importantly, it imposes a mandate on large employers.95 It creates
tax incentives for small employers to provide insurance, offering credits up to
35% of premium costs to small business that insure their employees.96
While the problems with the employer-based model discussed below have led
some observers to predict its demise,97 we have yet to see any retrenchment.
Instead, we have primarily continued down the path we started, attempting to
correct for specific problems of access and portability without facing down the
structural limitation of the model.98
What are the limitations of the employer-based model? There are several.
Most fundamentally, relying on employers for coverage renders employees
vulnerable to retrenchment in coverage. Indeed, we have observed in recent
decades that employees’ share of healthcare costs is increasing as a fraction of
total costs and that the mean quality of their coverage has fallen.99 The effect is
to shift the risk of both illness and medical costs to individuals from

proposal for health care reform, former Vice President Joe Biden emphasized the number of
Americans who, he said, were more than perfectly satisfied with the coverage they have.”).
94
Employer Shared Responsibility Provisions, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/affordable-careact/employers/employer-shared-responsibility-provisions [https://perma.cc/W8TC-D8AW]
(last updated Nov. 23, 2021) (“Under the Affordable Care Act’s employer shared
responsibility provisions, certain employers (called applicable large employers or ALEs) must
either offer minimum essential coverage that is ‘affordable’ and that provides ‘minimum
value’ to their full-time employees (and their dependents), or potentially make an employer
shared responsibility payment to the IRS.” (citation omitted)).
95
Affordable Care Act, 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(a), (c)(2).
96
Small Business Health Care Tax Credit and the SHOP Marketplace, IRS,
https://www.irs.gov/affordable-care-act/employers/small-business-health-care-tax-creditand-the-shop-marketplace [https://perma.cc/4KA6-ADDA] (last updated Feb. 24, 2022) (“If
you are a small employer, there is a tax credit that can put money in your pocket.”).
97
See, e.g., Warren Greenberg, Employer-Based Health Insurance: At the End of the
Line?, 20 HEALTH LAW. 38, 40 (2008) (“Since . . . employer-based health insurance has been
the main source of health insurance in the private sector for more than sixty years, realistic
policy proposals may have to encourage the demise of the employer-based system in a gradual
way.”); see also Amy B. Monahan & Daniel Schwarcz, Saving Small-Employer Health
Insurance, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1935, 1935 (2013) (“[A] number of interweaving provisions
embedded within the Affordable Care Act create strong incentives that, starting in 2014, will
tend to undermine these markets and, in the process, increase the fiscal cost of reform.”).
98
See David S. Caroline, Comment, Employer Health-Care Mandates: The Wrong
Answer to the Wrong Question, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 427, 446 (2009) (“[T]he challenge of
increasing efficient access to health care requires shifting employers out of the business of
providing health care, and instead finding creative ways to enable individuals to purchase the
care they want and need in a market-based system.”).
99
Michael Supanick, Private Insurance and Universal Healthcare: How Can Private
Insurance Be Utilized Within a Universal Healthcare System in the United States?, 30 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 551, 557-58 (2021) (discussing employees’ rising costs not matched by
increases in income).
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employers—a shift that employers can effectuate unilaterally at the contractual
level.100
Even when employers do provide high-level coverage, it is not clear that the
kinds of policies they purchase would be those that employees would purchase
themselves.101 I will discuss specific divergences between employer and
employee preferences below, but for now I point only to the basic agency
problems associated with an intermediary with imperfect information acting on
behalf of a heterogenous group of employees.102
Still another famous deficiency of the employer-based model is the problem
of portability. Most employees do not remain with a single employer for any
significant duration of their working lives; job tenure is shrinking.103 When an
employee leaves her job, she cannot take her insurance with her to her new
position. Even if she is able to purchase insurance for the interim at substantial
individual cost, transferring to another insurance network frequently requires a
change of healthcare provider.104 The effect is the phenomenon known as “job
lock.”105 Employees are artificially immobilized in the labor market,
exacerbating the labor market power of employers. While welfare measures
intended to promote healthcare access are ordinarily associated with employee
leverage and decommodification,106 the power exercised by employers over

100
See generally JACOB S. HACKER, THE GREAT RISK SHIFT: THE ASSAULT ON AMERICAN
JOBS, FAMILIES, HEALTH CARE AND RETIREMENT AND HOW YOU CAN FIGHT BACK (2006)
(arguing that economic risk, previously borne by corporate sector and government, has shifted
to individuals).
101
Dayna Bowen Matthew, Controlling the Reverse Agency Costs of Employment-Based
Health Insurance: Of Markets, Courts, and a Regulatory Quagmire, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
1037, 1040-41 (1996) (arguing that employers are poor agents for employees and their
insurance purchases do not reflect employee preferences well).
102
See Hyman & Hall, supra note 88, at 26-28 (describing agency problems). However,
Hyman and Hall contend that “employers do a reasonably good job reflecting their workers’
values and preferences,” id. at 30, and point out that employer-based insurance pools attenuate
the problem of adverse selection and facilitate cross-subsidization of high-cost consumerpatients, id. at 32-33.
103
See Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract: Implications of the
Changing Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 519, 540 (2001)
(describing increasing shift to temporary work).
104
See Hoffman, supra note 90, at 123 (“This means that when an individual leaves a job,
she cannot take her insurance with her, causing disruptions in coverage and often requiring
individuals to change their care providers.”).
105
See Jonathan Gruber & Brigitte C. Madrian, Health Insurance, Labor Supply, and Job
Mobility: A Critical Review of the Literature, in HEALTH POLICY AND THE UNINSURED 97, 98
(Catherine G. McLaughlin ed., 2004) (reviewing job lock phenomenon); see also Uwe E.
Reinhardt, Employer-Based Health Insurance: A Balance Sheet, 18 HEALTH AFFS. 124, 127
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See supra Part I.
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employees in the United States is actually greater than what would be expected
absent the intervention of federal healthcare policy.
Besides the structural effects of the employer-based healthcare model, in
recent years we have seen a more specific set of challenges arise from the power
of employers to choose what kind of healthcare benefits they offer employees.
These judgments turn out not to be driven by economic considerations alone or
information that the employer has about employee preferences. They turn too on
judgments about appropriate medical care.
Among its many new requirements, the ACA provided that employerinsurance must cover contraceptives for insured women. In Little Sisters of the
Poor Saints Peter & Paul Home v. Pennsylvania,107 the Supreme Court
permitted the Trump Administration to grant exemptions from that requirement
to employers with moral or religious objections to contraceptive coverage.108
This decision crystallized the limits to treating employers as neutral agents on
behalf of either the federal government (which subsidizes healthcare by way of
tax policy) or employees themselves. This decision was a culmination of a longterm political and social movement in favor of recognizing autonomy interests
on the part of business-employers. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1993 allowed individuals, including businesses, whose exercise of religion has
been burdened by a statute to sue.109 About a decade later, in Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc.,110 the Supreme Court held that a contraceptive mandate could
impose a substantial burden on religious exercise for for-profit, closely held
corporations.111 For some observers, these developments fairly vindicate the
idea that employers have genuine interests in what kind of health benefits they
purchase for their employees.112 If businesses are the kinds of entities that can
have religious liberty interests, the government can hardly regulate choices that
implicate those religious commitments.113
But as Elizabeth Sepper has argued, “courts [have] draw[n] incorrect
conclusions about the legal and moral responsibility of employers for the
contents of their employees’ insurance plans.”114 If employers are independent
moral agents making profound and intimate choices about appropriate medical
care, it is not clear how we can justify their involvement in those choices for
107

140 S. Ct. 2367 (2020).
Id. at 2386.
109
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(c).
110
573 U.S. 682 (2014).
111
Id. at 726 (“[T]he mandate clearly imposes a substantial burden on those beliefs.”).
112
See, e.g., Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Calculus of Accommodation: Contraception,
Abortion, Same-Sex Marriage, and Other Clashes Between Religion and the State, 53 B.C. L.
REV. 1417, 1429-32 (2012) (defending religious exemptions).
113
See Elizabeth Sepper, Free Exercise Lochnerism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1453, 1456-58
(2015) (describing tenets of business religious liberty movement).
114
Elizabeth Sepper, Contraception and the Birth of Corporate Conscience, 22 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 303, 304-05 (2014) (“Employee use of benefits no more burdens
employers than does their use of wages.”).
108
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other moral agents. Even if employers do have some kind of interest in which
benefits they proximately fund, their interest ought not to override the rights of
employees to make their own heath care choices.115 The effect of first delegating
to employers the task of insuring employees and then deferring to their deeply
personal judgments about what kind of insurance to buy has been to vault
employers to almost lord-like status over employees.116 Our unusual reliance on
employees to manage the social need for healthcare—a social policy problem
that every developed country has answered in some form—has made employees
dependent on employers for access to particular kinds of medical care. The
stakes of the employment contract are higher under this model than EspingAndersen ever contemplated.
C.

Vaccine Mandates

My two examples of artificially elevated stakes of employment have
concerned the allocation of social entitlements: rights to speech and rights to
healthcare. In these contexts, employers operate as gatekeepers that control
individual employees’ access to public discourse and healthcare, respectively.
More recently, vaccine mandates have raised the specter of employers
controlling another kind of fundamental social allocation: the burdens of
responding to a national public health crisis.
The United States may be at one extreme in this respect, but its policies are
not so aberrant in the spectrum of industrialized democracies as are its policies
in respect of speech and healthcare. While there are few countries in which the
state has directly imposed vaccine mandates on the population, in most
countries, mandates are tied in some way to employment.117 Here, we go further,
and employers not only manage the mandates but are responsible for their
enforcement.
Employer mandates preceded any governmental orders that required them.
The federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission issued guidance early
on in the pandemic to the effect that employers were permitted to require their
employees to be vaccinated as a condition of employment as long as employers
made reasonable accommodations for disabilities and religion.118 Private
115

See Leo E. Strine, Jr., A Job Is Not a Hobby: The Judicial Revival of Corporate
Paternalism and Its Problematic Implications, 41 J. CORP. L. 71, 75 (2015) (criticizing Hobby
Lobby’s extension of employers’ rights “beyond the workplace and into the employee’s
doctor’s office”).
116
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Robert Hart, Europe Kicks Off Some of the World’s Most Sweeping Vaccine Mandates
and Fines, FORBES (Jan. 17, 2022, 9:52 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/roberthart/2022
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What You Should Know About COVID-19 and the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and
Other EEO Laws, U.S. EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/wysk/what-you-should-know-about-
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initiative proved inadequate; thus, local, state, and federal governments began
imposing vaccine mandates on employees in particular sectors, especially the
healthcare sector.119 These culminated in the most sweeping mandate of all, a
federal executive order requiring that all large employers impose a vaccine
mandate on their employees unless those employees would not have exposure
to other employees.120 Most targeted vaccine mandates at the state level have
survived legal challenge.121 On the federal level, the Supreme Court recently
struck down the Biden order as an unauthorized exercise of agency power.122
The question that vaccine mandates raise for this discussion is not whether
they are a good idea as a general matter but whether the requirement to which
employees are subject should come from employers or from a governmental
body. Governments appear reluctant to directly order people to do anything with
their bodies. Vaccine mandates indeed implicate a fundamental liberty interest
and the specter of government coercion here is alarming, not unlike the manner
in which the specter of government regulation of speech offends the core
anxieties of the First Amendment. The problem is that relying on employers to
regulate vaccination does not make the coercive element of the mandate go
away. It merely switches the power behind the mandate. If vaccines mandates
are justified on public health grounds, they must be justified whether the
mandate comes most immediately from an employer or the government. The
prospect of individual employees avoiding the coercive effect of an employer
mandate by leaving their jobs promotes the illusion of free choice. If it is wrong
to force people to be vaccinated, it is wrong to force them to forego their
livelihoods to avoid vaccination. But if it is appropriate in an emergency to
require vaccination, then the public reasons that justify vaccination justify the
invocation of public authority to back the mandate. Relying on employers to
pursue the public objective expands the contractual authority of employers over
employees in an unprecedented and insidious way. There is a high bar before
citizens can demand vaccination of each other, but it is a demand we can make
covid-19-and-ada-rehabilitation-act-and-other-eeo-laws [https://perma.cc/43DT-Y6NV] (last
updated Mar. 14, 2022) (“The federal EEO laws do not prevent an employer from requiring
all employees physically entering the workplace to be fully vaccinated against COVID-19,
subject to the reasonable accommodation provisions of Title VII and the ADA and other EEO
considerations . . . .” (citation omitted)).
119
See, e.g., Tiernan, supra note 7.
120
Fact Sheet: Biden Administration Announces Details of Two Major Vaccination
Policies, WHITE HOUSE (Nov. 4, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingroom/statements-releases/2021/11/04/fact-sheet-biden-administration-announces-details-oftwo-major-vaccination-policies/ [https://perma.cc/4VJU-6GLY] (“All covered employers
must ensure that their employees have received the necessary shots to be fully vaccinated –
either two doses of Pfizer or Moderna, or one dose of Johnson & Johnson – by January 4th.”).
121
See, e.g., We the Patriots USA, Inc. v. Hochul, 17 F.4th 266, 296 (2d Cir.), opinion
clarified, 17 F.4th 368 (2d Cir. 2021); Doe v. Mills, No. 1:21-cv-00242, 2021 WL 4783626,
at *17-18 (D. Me. Oct. 13, 2021).
122
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Dep’t of Lab., OSHA, No. 21A244, slip op. at 1-2 (Jan.
13, 2022) (per curiam) (holding mandate exceeded OSHA’s statutory authority).
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under exigent circumstances. It is still more rarely the kind of demand employers
should have the power to make on us.
III. DISTINGUISHING CONTRACTUAL AND POLITICAL AUTHORITY
Why does it matter whether employers decide whether to provide certain
goods or impose certain burdens if the alternative is that the state will decide?
We might think that what really matters is the substance of the entitlements and
burdens that individuals bear. We might even think that it is in principle better
for important value judgments to be made privately rather than by the state.
I will argue to the contrary that the role of employers in allocating entitlements
and burdens is significant at multiple levels. First, the substance of who gets
what can be expected to be different when employers play a mediating role.
Second, the source of the authority behind an act of power is not only important
to the legitimacy of that act but, in a political community, important to the
legitimacy of political authority. Allocative judgments that are constrained by
principles of liberty and/or principles of distributive justice should be made by
public authorities, or if delegated, remain regulated to ensure adherence to those
public principles.
A.

Who Gets What

Most goods are allocated by employers as a set on the basis of features of
individual employers and of individual employees. In the case of healthcare, for
example, we would expect the kind of healthcare package offered by a given
employer (including, possibly, no healthcare package, if a smaller firm not
subject to the ACA mandate), to turn on the firm’s productivity, its size, the costs
of insuring its employee pool, and its perception of its workers’ preferences for
health insurance as compared to other modes of compensation. The employer
might then charge individual employees differently depending on the
compensation they are prepared to offer that employee, or the expected cost of
insuring them (including the number of their dependents). One fundamental
question raised by the employer model is whether the criteria that drive the
allocation of an entitlement are the right ones. All the criteria named above, with
the possible exception of the expected cost of insurance (especially if driven by
the number of insured), are morally arbitrary. No one deserves better health
insurance either because the firm that employs them is more competitive than a
rival or because the employee herself is more productive than a rival.123
However, in a market society, almost no goods and services, not least income,
are allocated on the basis of individual moral desert.124 The money we make in
123
See Ronald Dworkin, Comment on Narveson: In Defense of Equality, 1 SOC. PHIL. &
POL’Y 24, 29 (1983) (rejecting view that people deserve what they earn based on their talents).
124
There is a vast literature discussing the relationship between earnings and desert. See
generally, e.g., FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, 2 LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: THE MIRAGE OF
SOCIAL JUSTICE (1976); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); Samuel Scheffler, Justice
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our jobs, like the jobs themselves, reflect facts about the relative demand for our
labor and the particular skills we happen to have, and our basic structure assumes
that we are all better off for allowing differential rewards to labor even if those
differences do not align with desert.125
However, what we have observed is that the gatekeeper role that employers
play is not fully explained by the general benefits of relying on a market to
allocate social resources.126 Their role is enhanced by federal policy that pushes
them to play that role. The moral arbitrariness of the criteria that employers use
might be mitigated by specific federal laws that alter their incentives (for
example, by penalizing so-called Cadillac health plans as the ACA originally
did),127 but expanding the employer’s role in the provision of basic social goods
simultaneously expands the role of morally arbitrary criteria. Moreover, in the
case of intimate goods like healthcare, relying on employers as an intermediary
empowers employers to impose their idiosyncratic private judgments on
employees, raising still further the morally arbitrary consequences of a job.
The problem is present with respect to the other two examples of employment
stakes reviewed here. It might be less apparent that our speech rights depend on
morally arbitrary criteria because those criteria are not the familiar criteria that
drive demand for our labor. Instead, speech rights enjoyed by individuals will
turn on the sensitivity of an employer to the prospects of either legal liability or
retail accountability. A small manufacturing employer with a cohesive and
homogenous workforce might not find it worthwhile to police its employees’
social media presence. If the individual owner of the firm shares the cultural and
political sensibilities of her employees, she may have even less reason to care
what her employees are saying. These employees may enjoy great latitude and
not experience the threat of termination or discipline at work as constraining at
all in the context of speech. By contrast, even a low-level employee of a large
retail firm with a sophisticated human resources department may be subject to a
finely articulated social media policy; she may know that any misstep on social
media could easily be reported to her employer by any ill-wisher and it would
be used as grounds for termination—without severance, without notice, and
without appeal. She has every reason not to speak out about any topic that might
and Desert in Liberal Theory, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 965 (2000); ERIC RAKOWSKI, EQUAL JUSTICE
(1993); DAVID MILLER, PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL JUSTICE (1999); Richard J. Arneson,
Liberalism, Distributive Subjectivism, and Equal Opportunity for Welfare, 19 PHIL. & PUB.
AFFS. 158, 174-83 (1990); G.A. Cohen, On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice, 99 ETHICS
906, 914 (1989). I adopt here the “egalitarian” view that while earnings may reflect some
desert-relevant criteria, such as effort, earnings do not track desert given the significant role
played by the accidents of birth.
125
See RAWLS, supra note 124, at 75-83 (articulating “difference principle,” which holds
that inequalities in basic resources are only justified to extent they benefit least advantaged).
I do not address here whether it is empirically true that the inequalities we observe in our own
society in fact operate to the benefit of the least advantaged.
126
See supra Part II.
127
I.R.C. § 4980I(e)(1) (2012) (repealed Dec. 20, 2019).
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upset anyone. These two employees enjoy the same First Amendment
protection, of course. But at least some of the principles of autonomy and free
discourse that animate the First Amendment are undermined by a regime in
which individuals’ speech is regulated so unevenly by private employers, and
on grounds that do not track the criteria that might justify consequences for
wrongful speech acts.
Similarly, the desirability of vaccine mandates should be separated from the
question of whether it is desirable to rely on employers to impose and enforce
them. Not everyone is subject to a vaccine mandate. Most obviously, if the
executive order requiring that large employers impose them had stood,
employees of small businesses outside of certain essential or public-facing
sectors would not have been subject to the mandate.128 One might think that the
uneven application of the federal mandate cuts in its favor, as employees who
feel strongly against vaccination can gravitate to the employers that are not
subject to the directive. But not all employees are capable of switching jobs in
this way. Within the set of those individuals who are against vaccination,
whether one is effectively coerced into vaccination will depend on her ability to
get a job with an employer that does not impose a vaccine mandate. Even those
of us who would advocate more categorical public mandates recognize the
seriousness of demanding, subject to threat, that a person accept a chemical
injection into their bodies. The idea that people will or will not be subject to this
burden depending on their labor market power—which has nothing to do with
the justification for such a mandate and everything to do with its political costs—
is alarming. Employers are never a simple conduit for government policy. They
are not assigned their gatekeeping role for the sake of administrative
convenience. Their role is substantive. And it skews the all-important matter of
who gets what.
B.

Who Decides
Even if employers distributed entitlements and burdens according to optimal
criteria on the merits, the fact that employers decide who gets what can be
problematic in itself. I do not refer here to the social and personal costs of
employer authority per se. Instead, I largely take for granted for purposes of the
present discussion, that employers should control (subject to legal constraints)
basic pay, working hours, and the substance of what employees are asked to do.
When we rely on the market to allocate social resources, we rely on individual
firms to buy and use labor based on their ground-level information about how it
can be most productively utilized. This reliance on the market has harsh
consequences and so we have a range of employment and other protections
intended to limit the human toll of the market as an institution. But I am not
challenging here the power that employers enjoy in principle.
128

COVID-19 Vaccination and Testing; Emergency Temporary Standard, 86 Fed. Reg.
61,402 (Nov. 5, 2021), withdrawn, 87 Fed. Reg. 3,928 (Jan. 16, 2022) (to be codified at 29
C.F.R. pt. 1910).
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My concern is more narrow. When we collectively allow employers to decide
how much money a person takes home at the end of the week, we do so because
we think that there are social gains to be had from allocating that power to
employers. We have developed a collective habit, however, of allocating power
to employers not because we think they have the best information or incentives
to make decisions that ultimately operate to the public benefit but because the
state does not have the wherewithal to exercise its relevant power directly. We
have adopted an employer-based health insurance model not because we
concluded that it made sense to tie healthcare to employment but because we
have been unable to decouple them. We have not empowered—indeed,
expected—employers to control employee speech because we think they are
especially wise about the optimal boundaries of free speech or because we think
their interests mirror those of the public. Their power has emerged from a regime
incapable of articulating a zone of protected speech, given the fraught nature of
the boundary-drawing exercise. And finally, we have not allocated to employers
the job of getting people vaccinated because infection occurs primarily at work
or because its toll falls primarily on employers. We rely on employers because
the state dares not invoke its own authority; because we regard employers’
power over employees as less controvertible in this time and place.
Once an employer’s authority over an employee is not justified by reference
to a theory about market efficiency, however, it is not justified except by virtue
of the immediate consent of the employee. The employer’s authority is then
nothing but contractual authority. Contractual authority, though, is contingently
rather than deeply justified. That is, when A agrees to be subject to some power
of B through contract, the legitimacy of the authority B gains through contract
depends on the legitimacy of background institutions, and in particular, the
initial entitlements that led A and B to contract on the terms they ended up with.
In any individual case, we rarely have reason to assess the legitimacy of the
backdrop to a contract, such as any given employment contract. If the market
power that B has ex ante is legal, she (mostly) may extract what she will with it
from other market actors. But when a type of contract term is not specific to any
two parties but is a patterned response to background legal incentives, we should
ask whether and why we should set up so many As to the sweeping authority of
Bs. The fact that any one individual agrees to this arrangement does not justify
the social deference to contract as the mechanism by which to settle the matter
covered by that term. This is all the more so because, once the matter is “settled”
by contract by way of an allocation of discretion, the resulting allocation across
employers is opaque and difficult to reconstruct. Both for the individual
employee and from the standpoint of the public, there is no accountability for
the allocations made by “employers” as a set when the social outcome is the
unplanned result of millions of micro decisions. Again, for certain kinds of
outcomes, we have an affirmative theory—traditional economic theory—that
leads us to be optimistic about aggregate outcomes. This is not true when the
matter (of healthcare or speech access, etc.) is only within the realm of the
employment contract by virtue of legal interventions.

2022]

LOWERING THE STAKES OF EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT

1213

Unlike contractual authority, which is literally purchased and reflects relative
market power, political authority in a well-organized state is deeply justified.
Political authority in a democracy has higher pedigree than other kinds of
contingent authority. The judgments of the state about what to require of citizens
are often wrong, and rightly subject to constitutional limitation, but they are as
close as we can get to autonomous decision-making because they are literally
the requirements we collectively impose on ourselves. This Essay cannot fully
defend the justice of political authority, either in general or in the United States
today. I invoke instead the prevailing intuition, held on the basis of widely
disparate theories of political authority, that democratic governments have the
duty to provide and protect certain social goods; the right to impose burdens as
necessary to fulfill that affirmative duty, and; further, that it is the responsibility
of state actors to make hard judgments about these open-ended questions even
though they will always get them wrong in the eyes of many people.
If an employer’s prerogatives are too capacious, the employer is lordly. The
employment relationship no longer resembles an economic exchange because its
terms are not explicable by reference to the economic dynamic of the
relationship. Because the state has handed employers the task of making
allocative decisions for which the state should bear responsibility, employers
dominate employees more completely than even their market power alone would
enable. This is the opposite of what the state’s role in the employment
relationship should be.
CONCLUSION
My purpose in this Essay has been primarily to elucidate the way in which
political choices, or perhaps, political inertness, has raised the stakes of the
employment contract. We tend to justify the morally arbitrary differential
rewards of employment by reference to the function of the labor market in
helping to allocate social resources efficiently. We accept the moral costs of
inequality and hope tax and transfer regimes will mitigate its injustice. But
relying on employment to regulate the allocation of both goods and even burdens
in society has become a political strategy of deflection. It is an alternative to
making hard political choices about who gets what. The effect has been to raise
the stakes of employment even beyond the scope of those terms and conditions
that relate to attracting and extracting productive labor. To lower the stakes of
employment, we would need to take steps seemingly distant from the sphere of
employment narrowly construed. We would need to revitalize political discourse
to the point where we can rely on politics to deliver authoritative social
judgments. We would then no longer need to delegate those judgments to private
employers that lack the moral authority to make those judgments for the rest of
us.

